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“Poor Eliza” on the Border
Kirsten Silva Gruesz
University of California, Santa Cruz
No  human is illegal. The slogan, seen on countless 
protest signs, refutes the nativist rhe toric that turned “illegal” into a noun 
signifying criminal nonpersonhood. In the figure of the mi grant  mother, 
perilously journeying across the border or hiding from immigration of-
ficers in a sanctuary church, Stowe’s “Poor Eliza” reappears in altered 
form: a kind of “Pobre Elisa.” In the portrait of the teenaged Dreamer 
with perfect college test scores and aspirations to save the world, we see 
again the innocent child- protagonist of numerous sentimental fictions. 
In the melodrama of the undocumented person unaware of their status 
 until the fatal moment when an institution bars them entry, we hear 
echoes of literary “tragic mulattas” who discover with shock that their 
blood consigns them to chatteldom.  Today, brown- bodied supplicants 
are marshaled as exemplary cases to persuade the public to stand on 
their behalf against compassionless forces: nativists, vigilantes, the state 
itself. Many immigrant defense advocates invoke the abolitionist move-
ment as an inspiration, often without recognizing the moral binaries that 
problematically undergirded much of it.1 
 These examples suggest transtemporal similarities in sentimental 
repre sen ta tion: the visual and narrative strategies that respond to a gro-
tesquely dehumanizing system by soliciting sympathy and outrage on 
behalf of that system’s individual victims. But if sentimental reformism’s 
long history in the United States has taught us anything, it is that reaf-
firming the basic humanity of the other, while admittedly better than the 
alternative, sets the bar for ethical response far too low. The workings 
of sympathetic identification, and their constraint by ideologies of race, 
gender, and sexuality, have been a central preoccupation of American-
ists over the past three de cades: coincidentally, the same period during 
which the population of undocumented US residents, the majority of 
them Mexican, qua dru pled. The field’s extensive engagement with the 
politics of affect, then, invites us to ask how residual habits of identify-
ing or disidentifying with racialized  others might influence the moral 
legibility of noncitizen mi grants.2 
Despite the obvious differences between the nineteenth- century 
slave and the con temporary mi grant, each was the product of a deep, 
uneven history of racialization that emerged from the economic neces-
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sity of their  labor. The 2016 presidential election empowered an anti- 
immigrant and nativist component of the po liti cal spectrum, expanding 
an already- existing state apparatus of surveillance, pursuit, capture, de-
tention, and deportation. It reactivated and transformed previously ex-
isting strains of racism, including  those once used to justify the “removal” 
of Native  peoples, knotting up  those strands into a ball of negative pub-
lic feeling aimed, incoherently, against the perceived stranger- danger of 
Muslims, South Asians, and Mesoamericans regardless of citizenship 
status.3 As a result, undocumented  people, along with their often mixed- 
status families, increasingly experience life as  actual or potential fugi-
tives. The possibility that private citizens and municipal institutions 
might be deputized (or eco nom ically incentivized) to join in the enforce-
ment of federal immigration law— that doctors or teachers might be 
compelled to report undocumented users of health or education ser vices, 
for example— has led many to invoke the Underground Railroad as a 
re sis tance model, and not only meta phor ically. 
Beyond the question of sentimentalism’s repre sen ta tional optics, the 
slave and the undocumented mi grant share similar conditions of  legal 
vulnerability as noncitizens. One parallel emerges when the body in ques-
tion moves into a space where it is not permitted to be: a refugee whose 
request for asylum has not been approved; a fugitive from the slave re-
gime or from federal immigration authorities. The fugitive and the refu-
gee have more in common than a Latin root, for the latter term has 
under gone notable semantic shifts. In the nineteenth  century, when for-
eigners entering the United States  were labeled as “exiles,” “emigrés,” or 
“refugees,”  those terms invoked a claim to sympathy, though not to any 
special rights. More commonly, “refugee” was used to cast a sympathetic 
light on  those who  were internally displaced, such as Native  people 
driven from their homelands. But it could index Southern whites as well, 
as exemplified by the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned 
Lands, formed during the initial phase of Reconstruction, whose very 
name instantiated a racial apposition between African American 
“freedmen” and white “refugees.” The term, then, was highly mobile  until 
its precise  legal taxonomizing as a special kind of person- in- movement 
in the mid- twentieth  century. The 1951 UN Refugee Convention enti-
tled groups displaced by environmental disasters and/or civil vio lence to 
special consideration when they arrive at the borders of another nation 
and seek entry. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
determines which groups meet the bar for this  legal classification. In 
more than forty countries, the UNHCR alone has the power to make 
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refugee status determinations; in  others, including the United States, 
the receiving nation treats the agency’s findings as a guideline only. 
While the nation has always recognized the right of foreigners to peti-
tion for po liti cal asylum based on individual circumstance, its disposi-
tion to recognize the collectively experienced claims of refugee groups 
has historically been more tenuous.
 There is nothing inherently racialized in this modern category of the 
rights- bearing refugee. Yet in the United States, as Mae Ngai and  others 
have shown, that category has intersected with an immigration policy 
designed from the beginning to orchestrate the racial composition of the 
nation. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was the first of many legisla-
tive and judicial efforts to curb the entry of ethnic, religious, and racial 
“undesirables” through national- origin quotas. Strategic deployment of 
the term “refugee” still selectively elicited sympathy for certain groups 
through much of the early twentieth  century, although that did not pre-
vent racially charged forms of immigration control (witness the Roo se-
velt administration’s refusal to admit more than a trickle of Eu ro pean 
Jewish refugees prior to 1944). But it was not  until  after World War II that 
immigration policies articulated an effectively moral distinction be-
tween refugees and  others seeking entry. A hierarchy of motives was 
created, privileging the perceived helplessness and victimization of the 
refugee and elevating  those with heteronormative  family ties to current 
citizens over the “merely” economic motives of most ordinary im/ 
migrants through separate quotas for family- member visas. 
Nicholas De Genova has argued that the congressional reforms made 
between 1965 and 1980, which definitively integrated immigration con-
trol with this new formulation of international refugee law, fell with dis-
proportionate severity upon one nation: Mexico. That country’s proximity 
and deep historical ties to the United States had sent hundreds of thou-
sands of mi grants over the border, temporarily or permanently, since the 
turn of the  century. When national- origin quotas  were replaced with a 
cap on the total number of immigrants from the western hemi sphere, 
this effectively curtailed the number of visas available to Mexicans, even 
as their work opportunities in the north expanded. Thus, De Genova 
shows, the ideological foundation of “racialized Mexican/migrant 
 ‘illegality’ . . .  [as] “a natu ral fact” was already in place prior to the 
well- known geopo liti cal and environmental events that caused the ex-
traordinary spike of Mexican migration beginning in the 1990s: the 
devaluation of the peso, the widespread impoverishment and displace-
ment that followed NAFTA.4 Through repeated metonymic association, 
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“Mexican” became virtually synonymous with “illegal,” and the south-
ern border was figured as the site of that originary crime, even though 
neither association is accurate (one- third of undocumented residents 
come from outside the western hemi sphere, and visa overstay is at least 
as common as unauthorized border- crossing). 
US Americans, on the  whole, have embraced this relatively recent 
association between undocumented residency and criminality: as Lisa 
Cacho writes, “To be an ‘illegal alien’ is . . .  a de facto status crime. A 
person does not need to do anything to commit a status crime  because 
the person’s status is the offense in and of itself.”5 According to the 
scale of moral deservingness established in the  later twentieth  century, 
 there have been only brief instances when a Mesoamerican population 
commanded the sympathy associated with refugees. For instance, 
throughout the 1980s, when waves of Central Americans fled civil strife 
between radical peasant and  labor movements and US- backed conser-
vative forces, some quarter- million  people, mostly from El Salvador and 
Guatemala,  were admitted outside the regular quota system, legally 
privileged as refugees in a way that Mexicans— however constrained in 
their life choices by vio lence and poverty— never have been. But the 
sympathy was short- lived. 
 People fleeing the narco- bled economies and gang- infiltrated civil 
socie ties of the “Northern Triangle” of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Hon-
duras currently make up a large proportion of recent petitioners for en-
try to the United States. If mobilizing public sentiment for po liti cal 
reform requires a racialized “scene of subjection,” in Saidiya Hartman’s 
words, it is this specific group of mi grant bodies who have mostly 
been providing it. The summer of 2014 provided such a sensational-
ized spectacle: within the space of a few months, over 200,000 Central 
Americans— disproportionately  women and  children, and one- quarter 
of them unaccompanied minors— overwhelmed Immigrations and 
Customs Enforcement pro cessing capacity in Texas and Arizona. 
During that headline- grabbing moment, horrifying images of mi grants 
who lost limbs and lives to freight trains and predatory gangs provoked 
outrage, while poignant images of desperate  mothers huddled with 
 babies invited sympathy. President Obama labeled the influx a “human-
itarian crisis” while being careful not to incur responsibility for ac-
cepting them en masse  under the label of “refugees,” a designation the 
UNHCR had already given to Salvadorans. In subsequent months, 
the number of border apprehensions dropped dramatically, not  because 
 people stopped leaving the Northern Triangle but  because of aid 
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 initiatives that deputized Mexico to intensify its own mi grant policing 
at the Guatemalan border and thus moved the crisis offstage. 
As Berlant points out, the scene of Eliza’s flight across the frozen 
Ohio is a constant across adaptations of  Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and  these 
briefly ubiquitous images of  women fleeing with their  children across 
hostile terrain had a similar affective power in 2014. For media cover-
age also turned to the euphemistically named “ family residential 
centers”— many privately run by for- profit prison corporations—in which 
child mi grants  were  housed, with or without parents, for months or years 
while awaiting the outcome of their petitions for asylum in an over-
burdened court system. Activist demands have galvanized around 
 these carceral spaces, opening a crack in the mainstream view of unau-
thorized immigration as a “de facto status crime” by appealing to a core 
nineteenth- century Christian sentiment: the sanctity of the  family. Just 
as the anguished selling- away of enslaved  children from their  mothers 
became an effective repre sen ta tional tactic for antislavery reformers, the 
forcible separation of detained parents from their  children at the border 
has so far been rejected as unacceptable— even by immigration foes. 
Although the border wall has served as a power ful totem for Trumpism, 
the border is no longer the key site of sentimental drama around the Me-
soamerican body. Instead, the scene has shifted to ICE enforcement 
practices that disrupt  family life in the schools and streets of any and 
 every town, as cameras dwell on the pain of longtime resident parents 
dragged unwillingly from legal- status  children. Such patterns of repre-
sen ta tion, with their echoes of the nineteenth  century’s selective senti-
mentalism and calculated affect,  will continue to demand close scrutiny.6 
But  these echoes go beyond the repre sen ta tional. If the border de-
tention center represents a dangerous and agency- less space for the 
fugitive migrant/refugee, its inverse is the sanctuary: the church, campus, 
city, or other space that declares itself in opposition to federal immigra-
tion enforcement. Like the sanctuary movements for Vietnam draft 
resistors and for unauthorized Central American leftists in the 1980s, 
 these promigrant institutions invoke the Underground Railroad as their 
antecedent. With local and federal authorities now poised to do  battle 
over jurisdiction to enforce immigration status crimes, parallels emerge 
with both the stories and the  legal status of fugitive slaves.7 The possi-
bility that slaves might liberate themselves— might change their status 
by escaping to a  free state— created inherent conflicts between states, 
and between state and federal authority, even at the framing of the 
Constitution.  These conflicts  were inadequately addressed in turn by 
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the draconian Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, the 1842 Supreme Court de-
cision Prigg v. Pennsylvania, and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. None 
of  these mea sures resolved the under lying disagreement over  whether 
certain  humans could be held for life as chattel. Instead, as the  legal 
scholar James Kraehenbuehl has described it, they created a patchwork 
of zones of under- and overenforcement of federal law by municipali-
ties and states, channeling a highly controversial and partisan national 
debate into narrowly local controversies— just as the “broken” immigra-
tion system, tied up in congressional stalemate since the last significant 
legislative reform in 1996, does  today. Whereas state- specific legislative 
efforts like California’s Proposition 187 (1994) and Arizona’s SB 1070 
(2010) sought to overenforce federal immigration policies by further re-
stricting the movement of undocumented residents within specific 
states, self- designated sanctuary cities, campuses, and churches seek 
to underenforce  those policies. The variegated history of fugitive 
slave law thus offers a  legal pre ce dent for the key questions about 
preemption— the concept that federal law displaces contradicting mu-
nicipal and state law— that  will determine  future decisions about such 
efforts at over- or underenforcement of immigration “status crimes.” 8 
Nineteenth- century antislavery discourse represented a spectrum 
of ethical and po liti cal positions, many of which  were perfectly compati-
ble with the perpetuation of racism itself.  Today, some  favor immigration 
reforms that are strongly inflected with the standards of moral be hav ior 
applied to supplicant characters in sentimental fiction: rewards, in the 
form of a path to citizenship, should only come to  those who wait pa-
tiently, obey even the most minor rules, and pay reparations for commit-
ting what continues to be framed as their sin, their crime. Calls for 
“compassionate repatriation”— a kinder, gentler deportation regime— 
recall one nineteenth- solution to the hard work of coexistence: offshoring 
to Liberia. But  these  were never the only options, nor are they now. Lloyd 
Pratt has shown how the slavery argument was articulated through the 
figure of the (presumptively African American) stranger in the nineteenth 
 century, and it is suggestive that the two key biblical imperatives that 
 were understood to spell out the duty of the Christian  toward the stranger, 
Leviticus 19:33–34 and Matthew 25:35–45, are frequently invoked by pro-
migrant and sanctuary activists  today. Pratt, however, shows how sympa-
thetic abolitionist readings of  those passages consigned the stranger to 
be a permanent object of humanistic benefaction: its “mode of address 
sought to constitute a category of persons to oversee and to whom one 
could be responsible.”9 Frederick Douglass’s writing, in contrast, 
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taps into a rising popu lar and literary sentiment that emphasized 
the stranger’s modern ubiquity to make a renewed case for the 
universality of strangerhood. Douglass in this way redefines 
strangerhood as the condition of being  human; as he does so, he 
also rejects the emphasis on strangers having a right to nothing 
more than hospitality.
Douglass, argues Pratt, “insists on a world in which we are all strangers 
and hosts at once,” a sphere of po liti cal participation not divided into 
hosts and strangers but of universal “stranger- with- ness.”10 
Open- borders advocates have shown that it is perfectly pos si ble to 
distinguish the right to migrate between nations from other rights that 
we associate with citizenship or  legal residency, such as the right to vote, 
own property, or use public ser vices. Yet just as the complete and im-
mediate abolition of slavery and of all forms of racial in equality was 
difficult for most white antislavery activists to imagine, so too do most 
of us find unimaginable a world in which  every individual’s freedom of 
movement would be universally guaranteed. The reformist vision of a 
“path to citizenship” implies gradualism, not immediatism: slow changes 
in policy and social life, not the dissolution of national border controls. 
Yet so long as the state restricts the movement of persons through the 
institution of borders, it  will selectively distribute the right to be close 
to  others with whom we have formed attachments. Noncitizens, espe-
cially when they are racialized by formulations like “Mexican/illegal” and 
“Muslim/terrorist,”  will continue to be disproportionately subject to vio-
lence and rightlessness, simply  because their presence in a par tic u lar 
place renders them criminals, fugitive from the law. As long as we see 
ourselves as hosts and not as fellow- strangers, we  will carry this 
 burden of feeling, this ethical demand as yet unmet. 
Notes
1. My title is obviously indebted to Lauren Berlant’s 2002 essay “Poor Eliza,” which became 
the first chapter of The Female Complaint (Duke University Press, 2008), and to her call to con-
tinue investigating the “unfinished business of sentimentality” (34). Alongside Berlant’s work 
on affect and politics, that of Shirley Samuels, Dana Nelson, Glenn Hendler, and Linda Williams 
has been especially formative for the field. “Dreamers” is an omnibus term for undocumented 
youth, not all of whom qualified for relief  under Obama’s 2012 DACA order. Jose Antonio Var-
gas’s account of his discovery of his hidden status in “My Life as an Undocumented Immigrant,” 
New York Times Magazine, June 26, 2011, MM22 stands as a template for many sympathetic 
profiles.
2. In 1990, the undocumented population was estimated at 3 million; in 2017, 11 million, 
down from a high of over 12 million in 2006. See Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, “Frequently Re-
quested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States,” Migration Informa-
tion Source, March 8, 2017, http:// www . migrationpolicy . org.
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3. I use “Mesoamerican” to refer to Mexicans and Central Americans together, to under-
score how mestizo and indigenous populations are racialized in the United States regardless of 
national origin.
4. Nicholas De Genova, Working the Bound aries: Race, Space, and “Illegality” in Mexi-
can Chicago (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 242. See 213–49 for the detailed 
argument.
5. Lisa Marie Cacho, Social Death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization of 
the Unprotected (New York: New York University Press, 2014), 43.
6. Activist co ali tions like the UndocuQueers have rejected this systemic privileging of 
heteronormative biological families.
7. For instance, the historian Richard White invoked Anthony Burns to argue that a high- 
profile Dreamer detention might similarly sway public opinion  toward serious immigration 
reform (San Francisco Chronicle, March 5, 2017).
8. James A. Kraehenbuehl, “Lessons from the Past: How the Antebellum Fugitive Slave 
Debate Informs State Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law,” University of Chicago Law 
Review 78 (2011): 1465.
9. Lloyd Pratt, The Strangers Book: The  Human of African American Lit er a ture (Phila-
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 62.
10. Ibid., 45.
Beyond “Amer i ca for the Americans”:  
Race and Empire in the Work  
of Demesvar Delorme
Marlene L. Daut
University of  Virginia
In his 1866 book La Démocratie et le préjugé de 
couleur aux Étas Unis/Les Nationalités Américaines et le système 
Monroë, the nineteenth- century Haitian author and politician Demesvar 
Delorme observed that the US Civil War (1861–65) had done  little to dis-
rupt the racism that had impeded American democracy from the origin 
of the US nation onward. “The blacks,” he explained,
cannot become citizens. They are considered a separate and 
inferior race. That is the sacramental explanation of the  
contradiction of color prejudice in the United States . . .  And this 
self- serving fiction has helped them to perpetuate the prejudices 
whereby the black man, even when liberated from slavery, lives 
without the rights of citizenship within American democracy.1
For Delorme, the fact that the United States had not immediately out-
lawed color prejudice  after the Civil War, as Haiti had done in its first 
constitution in 1805, issued one year  after in de pen dence from France, 
